Global competition surrounding the Arctic shipping route is intensifying. Major powers such as Russia, China, and the United States are accelerating the development of the Arctic shipping route, each focusing on resources, logistics, and security, and are moving to secure ‘new maritime hegemony’.
According to the ‘Trends and Implications of Arctic Shipping Route Development by Major Countries’ report, published last October by the Industrial Technology Research Center of the KDB Future Strategy Institute, the countries currently accelerating the development of the Arctic shipping route the most are Russia, China, and the United States.
Russia is the country whose territory is most intertwined with the Arctic shipping route. 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline borders Russia. Of the 4 million people residing in the Arctic, 63% are Russian. Approximately 7% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 11% of its exports are based on the Arctic Ocean.
A representative project for Russia’s Arctic shipping route development is the ‘Trans-Arctic Integrated Transport Corridor’. This project is a national-level strategy to connect the Arctic shipping route with inland transportation networks and develop it into a global energy and industrial hub.
Russia’s history of Arctic shipping route development is long. According to the report, Arctic exploration began in the 17th century, and Russia officially established its first Arctic strategy in 1932 during the Soviet Union era. At that time, the ‘Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput)’ was established and was tasked with navigation of the Arctic shipping route, infrastructure development, securing economic resources, and managing port waterways.
Subsequently, in 1937, after 25 vessels suffered casualties due to extreme climate change on the Arctic shipping route, the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route was disbanded. Arctic shipping route development projects then remained stagnant, but resumed Arctic development in 2008 under the ‘Basic Principles of the Russian Federation’s Arctic Policy’. Furthermore, in 2022, the disbanded Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route was revived as an integrated management body.
Currently, Russia possesses 45 icebreakers, excluding patrol vessels. Of these, 8 are nuclear-powered icebreakers. One is a nuclear-powered container ship, supporting year-round operation of the Arctic shipping route.
Of the 14 icebreakers to be additionally constructed in the future, 4 will be equipped with second-generation nuclear propulsion engines. The remaining 10 will be built as liquefied natural gas (LNG) fueled vessels.
In addition to icebreakers, Russia plans to construct an additional 1,600 merchant ships and marine equipment by 2036. Furthermore, it is focusing on building facilities for Arctic shipping route operations and inland connections, including the development of major ports.
Russia anticipates that the Arctic shipping route will be commercialized by 2036. By then, it plans to invest $6.4 billion (approximately 10 trillion won) to build 1,600 merchant ships and marine equipment.
Subsequently, in preparation for year-round operation of the Arctic shipping route, 1.8 trillion won will be invested solely in the construction of container terminals and LNG crude oil terminals, among other facilities.
China plans to utilize the Arctic shipping route as the maritime axis of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) policy. This is the ‘Ice Silk Road’ strategy, connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
China, like South Korea, does not border the Arctic. Despite being a so-called non-Arctic state, it plans to utilize the Arctic as a passage connecting various land-based economic corridors. For example, it aims to procure crude oil and LNG from Russia via the Arctic shipping route and expand this into a new trade route.
China plans to unload cargo at European ports via the Arctic shipping route and connect it with railway and road networks passing through the Middle East and Central Asia, including Russia, Turkey, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, it aims to expand its influence to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states such as Finland and Norway.
China currently possesses 5 icebreakers for research and supply purposes. It is also jointly constructing a container icebreaker with Russia, targeting its inauguration in 2027.
Joint projects with Russia are not limited to shipbuilding. Chinese state-owned companies, cargo owners, and local governments are investing $2.5 billion in four Russian ports along the Arctic Ocean coast.
A representative project involves modernizing Russia’s Zarubino port to increase its annual handling capacity to 60 million tons. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) also invested $27 billion in Russia’s Yamal LNG project, securing a 20% stake.
Most notably, China began commercial operations using the Arctic shipping route for the first time in the world last September. This policy aims to secure a market advantage. At that time, the Chinese shipping company ‘Sea Legend’ dispatched the 4,890 TEU container ship ‘Istanbul Bridge’ from Ningbo-Zhoushan Port in China to Felixstowe Port in the UK. The ‘Istanbul Bridge’, which was not equipped with ice-strengthening capabilities, arrived at its destination in the UK after 20 days.
The United States historically utilized the Arctic Ocean coastline to deter the Soviet Union. This began in 1951 with the construction of an air base (now a space base) in northwestern Greenland to perform early warning and air defense missions. This is because the Arctic is the shortest path for intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. has even pursued the purchase of Greenland four times for military reasons, specifically to counter Russia and China.
Experts analyze that the U.S. stance has changed in recent years. Beyond utilizing the Arctic Ocean as a strategic security point, it is now preparing for commercial operations. However, it is still distinguished from other countries by its underlying focus on ‘security’.
The U.S. Navy announced its ‘Arctic Strategic Blueprint’ in 2021, outlining plans to strengthen naval power and infrastructure over the next 20 years.
Last June, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would purchase up to 15 icebreakers from Finland and share icebreaking technology with allies. Furthermore, the system for managing and overseeing Arctic shipping route development, which had been dispersed, was changed to be ultimately managed and supervised by the White House.
These changes are interpreted as a move to counter the expanding influence of Russia and China, while also securing leadership in the future maritime hegemony competition.
The U.S. allocated $9 billion last year for icebreaker construction and Arctic infrastructure development, increasing its investment. Approximately $8 billion was allocated solely for icebreaker construction, aiming to build a total of 16 icebreakers.
As major countries accelerate their preparations for the Arctic shipping route, South Korea’s response is evaluated as being in a relatively early stage. For latecomers, opportunities to participate may be limited in a situation where Russia’s infrastructure, China’s logistics network, and the U.S.’s security order are being established.
Despite South Korea’s world-class shipbuilding technology and geographical advantages, its weaknesses include: “lack of experience in icebreaker operation and route management,” “insufficient strategic investment and policy consistency,” and “limitations in international cooperation networks.”
The report advised that the government should establish an inter-ministerial body for role division and task coordination, and connect land and sea transportation routes.
The report added, “It is necessary for South Korea to not limit the role of the Arctic shipping route to merely a sea transportation route, but to develop it into a medium- to long-term economic corridor by establishing land or sea connection networks.”
